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 This inspection assessed the work of the UK Border Agency’s border operations 
in Scotland and Northern Ireland.  It forms part of a wider inspection which is 
comprised of three parts: the Agency’s border operations, the Common Travel Area 
and representation at first tier appeals in Scotland.
 At the time of the inspection, Border Force was one year into a programme 
integrating the work of immigration and illicit commodity detection. The UK 
Border Agency’s Border Force officers in Scotland and Northern Ireland work to 
intercept and seize illicit commodities as well as identify those who do not have 
the right to enter the UK. I found that the focus of staff deployment at airports is concentrated on 
the Primary Checkpoint, potentially at the expense of illicit commodity detection. I believe a better 
balance should be found by the Agency to address these competing demands.  
 At the ports I inspected, I was surprised to find that the Agency had not made any seizures from 
freight containers for the 14 month period between the end of September 2009 and our inspection in 
November 2010. Additionally, there were very limited class A drugs seizures over a similar timeframe. 
 I was also concerned that the significant challenge of managing the risks presented by small airfields 
and harbours has not been met. I recommend that a multi–agency approach to the risk assessment 
of small ports is established both locally and nationally. This would also leverage the expertise of the 
police who have a well established role in assessing the risks posed by terrorism and organised crime.  
 Overall, I found that the Agency needs to improve its intelligence picture to better inform how it will 
address threats to the UK border in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
 
 John Vine CBE QPM
 Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency
Foreword from John Vine CBE QPM
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1. The inspection involved collecting evidence to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of operations 
at the border in Scotland and Northern Ireland by assessing:
•	 the deployment of staff to Aberdeen Airport, Edinburgh Airport and docks and Belfast International 
Airport and docks;
•	 the risk assessment of ports with no permanent UK Border Agency presence;
•	 how detection staff select people, vehicles and freight for search;
•	 treatment of passengers; and
•	 how the Agency engages and works with stakeholders and delivery partners.
2. There was no evidence of unfair treatment during our observations of people being stopped for 
search by detection officers. However this was based on limited observations of primarily European 
Economic Area (EEA) nationals. Officers were able to explain the reasons for stopping each person 
we saw stopped by teams at Aberdeen, Belfast and Edinburgh. 
3. Independent evidence from passenger surveys and the low number of written complaints were 
consistent with our observations that staff were courteous and professional. In all three locations, 
officers stated complaints were frequently received, but only nine verbal complaints were recorded 
in the first six months – failure to log all complaints and report them to the Border Force Customer 
Service Unit is contrary to policy.
4. Stakeholder relations were good. Port operators spoke highly of the Agency and credited senior 
managers in Scotland and Northern Ireland with improving stakeholder relations. In Edinburgh, senior 
management and the airport operator worked well together to mitigate a potential security breach.
5. As part of the integration training, all officers operating the Primary Checkpoint (PCP) have received 
‘Referral to Secondary Examination’ training and are now designated as Customs Officers under 
sections 78 and 163A of the Customs and Excise Management Act (1979). The effect is that officers 
on the PCP can work in both an immigration and customs detection capacity and can refer a person 
on from the PCP for further investigation for either a customs or immigration purpose. This has 
increased the capability of officers at the PCP to detect potential illicit commodities. Training to 
enhance detection capability at ports continues with the legacy immigration officers. 
6 At all the ports inspected, we found the Primary Checkpoint was the main focus for the Agency. 
This was to meet both the requirement to verify all passengers against security and immigration 
databases and meet internally set queuing targets. This emphasis reduced the officers available to 
identify imports of illicit goods through detection work. A better balance needs to be found between 
deploying officers to the PCP and detection work. 
7. We found that deployment of officers to identify illicit goods was informed by the Agency’s strategic 
priorities. Local assessments of flights were based on past practice, previous seizures, new trends based 
on seizures as well as intelligence. However, in 2010, there had been no seizures of class A drugs by 
teams at Aberdeen, with only small seizures at Belfast and Edinburgh. This is despite class A drugs 
seizures being set as one of the highest priorities for the Agency indicating an intelligence gap. 
1. Executive Summary
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8. Deployment of staff was reactive, with duties changed at short notice in response to intelligence. We 
found a real commitment from officers to identify and seize illicit commodities, sharing information 
on trends and using local knowledge to good effect. However, over-reliance on historical information 
led to repeated targeting of the same flights. 
9. This emphasis on tried and tested routes could leave other routes open to abuse as those willing  
to circumvent the system make use of flights with less coverage, knowing they are unlikely to  
be apprehended.
10. There was little coverage of air freight or commercial shipping and little activity to counter the 
potential threat of movement of illicit commodities over the Irish land border. There had been no 
seizures from the scanning of freight containers at Belfast and Grangemouth for the 14 month period 
between the end of September 2009 and our inspection in November 2010. 
11. Very little risk assessment work was performed on the threats and risks posed by small air fields and 
harbours and it was unclear who had responsibility for this area. We found no threat assessments had 
been undertaken since March 2008. 
12. The Agency generally had a good working relationship with the police. However, there is no evidence 
of joint risk assessments of small ports despite Special Branch conducting visits to these ports to map 
the risks posed by terrorism and organised crime.
13. Overall, there was a need to improve the comprehensiveness of the intelligence picture to better 
inform the threats to the border, including the risks posed by small ports.
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We recommend that the UK Border Agency:
1. Deploys resources effectively to maintain the control of illicit commodities with the staffing 
of the Primary Checkpoint (PCP)  
2. Identifies and addresses intelligence gaps to improve the intelligence picture to better inform 
the risks to the border.     
3. Ensures that plans and associated control strategies are published in a timely manner to 
inform staff and allow more effective targeting of resources 
4. Devises a strategy to address the threat posed to the border by illicit commodities and people 
through small ports. 
5. Puts in place local comprehensive written guidance for staff dealing with General Aviation1, 
including compliance visits.  
6. Ensures that frontline staff provide feedback and that it is used to inform the targeting process
7. Initiates a multi-agency approach to risk assessing small ports, working with the police, port 
operators and any other relevant organisations. 
1  General aviation (GA) is one of the two categories of civil aviation. It refers to all flights other than military and scheduled airline and 
regular cargo flights, both private and commercial. 
2. Summary of Recommendations
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3.1 The role of the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency was established by the UK 
Borders Act 2007 to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the UK Border Agency. The Border 
Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 widened the Chief Inspector’s role to cover customs functions 
and the work of contractors.   
3.2 The Chief Inspector is independent of the UK Border Agency and reports directly to the  
Home Secretary. 
Purpose and Aim 
3.3  To undertake an inspection of the UK Border Agency’s operations in Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
collecting evidence to enable the Chief Inspector to make an assessment of the Agency’s efficiency  
and effectiveness.  
Scope
3.4     This report assesses the work of the UK Border Agency’s Border Force operations in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland – in particular it looks at:
•	 the deployment of detection staff to the following air and seaports: Aberdeen Airport, Edinburgh 
Airport and docks and Belfast (Belfast International Airport) and docks; we chose these ports given 
the concentration on Glasgow for the other parts of the inspection.  
•	 the risk assessment of small ports for both people and goods, where no permanent Agency  
presence exists;
•	 how detection staff select people, vehicles and freight for search; 
•	 the treatment of passengers by Agency officers, in terms of  general courtesy and discrimination 
through profiling; and
•	 how the Agency engages and works with stakeholders and delivery partners. 
Methodology
3.5 A one day pre-inspection planning meeting was held at Glasgow on 23 August 2010. The onsite phase 
covering three locations of the inspection took place from 1 November 2010 to 10 January 2011. 
3.6 A range of methods were used during the inspection, including:
•	 assessment of a wide range of evidence provided by the Agency 
•	 interviews and focus groups of a variety of staff in three locations
•	 observations at Primary Checkpoints (also known as passport control), the secondary examination 
areas and of container freight scanning; and 
•	 consultation with a range of stakeholders. (see Appendix 2)
3.7 The inspection team provided feedback on high level emerging findings to the UK Border Agency 
nine days after the completion of the onsite phase of the inspection.
3.8 The inspection identified seven recommendations for improvement to operational service 
delivery of UK Border Agency operations in Scotland and Northern Ireland. A full summary of 
recommendations is provided on page 5 of this report.  
3. The Inspection
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4.1 The UK Border Agency is divided into seven operational business areas:
•	 Border Force
•	 International Group
•	 Immigration Group
•	 Intelligence Group
•	 Criminality and Detention
•	 Corporate Services
•	 Strategy and Policy
 The majority of UK based staff work within either Immigration Group or Border Force.  
Border Force
4.2 The UK Border Agency was formed in 2008 following the amalgamation of the Border and 
Immigration Agency, UK Visas and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). At the time of 
the inspection, Border Force had around 9000 staff following the formal permanent transfer of over 
4000 ‘customs’ staff from HMRC on 5 August 2009.  The creation of a single Border Force within 
the UK Border Agency was designed to ‘create a multi-skilled integrated workforce to improve security at 
the border, facilitate legitimate travel and trade and provide increased flexibility to tackle areas of greatest 
risk and pressures’.
4.3 At the time of the inspection, Border Force was one year into a programme integrating the work of 
immigration and illicit commodity detection. As part of the integration training, all officers operating 
the Primary Checkpoint (PCP) have received ‘Referral to Secondary Examination’ training and 
are now designated as Customs Officers under sections 78 and 163A of the Customs and Excise 
Management Act (1979). The effect is that officers on the PCP can work in both an immigration 
and customs detection capacity and can refer a person on from the PCP for further investigation for 
either a customs or immigration purpose. The effect of the training is to increase the capability of 
officers at the PCP to detect potential illicit commodities. Training to enhance detection capability at 
ports continues with the legacy immigration officers. 
Border Force North
4.4    Scotland and Northern Ireland are within Border Force North Region; the largest geographical 
Border Force region which has an extensive coastline. The region is responsible for a number of major 
air and sea ports whilst at the same time managing the risk posed by numerous small air and sea 
ports. Border Force staff have operational responsibility for immigration controls and the detection of 
illicit goods. They also seize cigarettes and tobacco on behalf of HMRC who retain responsibility for 
the collection and enforcement of tobacco duties as part of the excise tax regime. Border Force North 
region is itself divided into five sub-regions, called commands.
4. Background
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 Figure 1 shows the organisational structure of the senior management team in Border Force North.
 Figure 1 Border Force North – Senior Management Team
Scotland and Northern Ireland Region
4.5 At the time of the inspection, operations in Scotland and Northern Ireland were each under the 
command of an Assistant Director. We set out below the details of the three airports inspected, 
covering the geographical spread and variation in work of each.  
 
4.6 Aberdeen covers the area from the north bank of the Tay to Oban.  They had 33 staff2 in total made up 
of three teams: one at the PCP and two focussing on detection work. Numbers of staff were roughly 
equal with 17 staff available for the PCP and 16 for detection. Four part-time staff were based in remote 
locations: Inverness, Oban and two in Lerwick.
4.7   Edinburgh covers the east of Scotland from the south bank of the River Tay to the border. The 
western boundaries are those of the Strathclyde and Dumfries and Galloway police forces.  Edinburgh 
had 59 staff in total divided into eight teams, four on the PCP and three working on detection 
duties at the airport. One team covered freight to deal with container traffic at Grangemouth and the 
Zeebrugge ferry at Rosyth, with assistance from one of the airport teams if required. Numbers were 
almost equal with 30 staff allocated for the PCP and 29 for detection. The actual number of staff for 
detection work was reduced by five officers when the mobile Cyclamen3 unit was in operation. 
4.8   Belfast covers the whole of Northern Ireland with 57 staff divided into six teams – three on the PCP, 
two for detection work at the airport and one on freight to cover containers at Belfast docks. The 
freight team also checks undelivered parcels and covers international trade on behalf of HMRC. 
There were 17 staff available for the PCP, 28 for detection at the airport and 12 for freight.  
2  Numbers taken from organograms supplied by UKBA excluding Higher Officers/Chief Immigration Officers or Senior Officers/Immigration 
Inspectors who manage the teams  
3  Radiation detection unit 
Regional Director
Deputy Director
Assistant Director 
Business Support
Assistant Director 
Intelligence, 
Assurance & Risk
Assistant Director 
Manchester 
Airport
Assistant Director 
Humber
Assistant Director 
North Ports
Assistant Director 
Scotland
Assistant Director 
Northern Ireland
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4.9   In addition to Belfast International Airport, during the summer, daily international flights arrive 
at the City of Derry Airport which is 75 miles from Belfast. Belfast City Airport also has a limited 
number of international flights mainly from the European Union and interlined bags4 from third 
countries where passengers have cleared passport control at Heathrow but their bags have not been 
checked for illicit commodities. 
4.10    Detection staff in Belfast also have responsibility for the land border from the Republic of Ireland. 
However, with 320 miles of the border, 302 recognised border points, as well as the considerable 
political and security issues, no detection work has been carried out on the border and countering the 
threat remains a difficult issue for the UK Border Agency.
4  Bags owned by passengers who have cleared detection at Heathrow but their bags have come straight to Belfast. 
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 Operational policies, priorities and deployment of staff is driven by clear analysis of 
environment, risks, threats, capabilities and impact.
Deployment priorities
5.1 Deployment of Border Force staff is driven by priorities set out in the Border Force Control Strategy. 
These priorities were disseminated to all regions via the strategic Tasking and Co-ordination Group 
meetings (TCG). Staff are informed of priorities through the briefing process.  
5.2    Although the Border Force Control Strategy provides details of the risks to, and subsequent priorities 
for, Border Force as a whole, we were told by a senior manger that the top priorities could be 
summarised at high level as those stated for critical incidents. These are as follows:
1. staffing the Primary Checkpoint (PCP);
2. Cyclamen5;
3. custody (there were no custody facilities in the ports inspected); 
4. detection of class A drugs; and
5. detection of other illicit commodities.
5.3    The focus on staffing the PCP is to ensure entry to the UK is checked and also that customer service 
standards are met. A key performance indicator of the Agency is to meet the following queuing times:
•	 95% of European Economic Area (EEA) passengers to wait no longer than 25 minutes;
•	 95% of non European Economic Area (EEA) passengers to wait no longer than 45 minutes.
 Performance in terms of identifying illicit commodities was measured by contribution to national 
targets. Each region had specific targets for each commodity. However, there were no specific 
targets for the Northern Ireland and Scotland commands. Instead, the commands were allocated 
‘indicative’ targets to measure their contribution to the overall regional target. The UK Border 
Agency could not explain their rationale for how indicative targets were allocated, nor were we 
provided with documentary evidence to show how they were allocated. There were no specific 
targets for individual ports.
5.4  We found that staff were fully aware of the indicative targets and current priorities. Through our 
interviews and discussions, it was clear they were aware of the indicative targets set individually for 
the commands of Scotland and Northern Ireland and how these contributed to the national targets. 
Reinforcing our recent inspection findings at Manchester Airport, we found it difficult to understand 
how each port’s performance could be measured without specific port targets.
5.5  However, we note that the UK Border Agency has recently (in December 2010) accepted our 
recommendation from the Manchester Airport report6 to review the rationale behind Border Force 
targets, including how productivity performance in tackling smuggling risks might be best assessed. 
5  Radiological and nuclear detection unit. The tasking of staff to operate Cyclamen is assessed by a central team; deployment required for 
25% of Rosyth traffic   
6  http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/UKBA-response-Manchester-Airport-report.doc.pdf An inspection 
of border control at Manchester Airport 
5.  Inspection findings – High level 
outcomes of the business
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 Primary Checkpoint (PCP)
5.6  The UK Border Agency told us that the main priority of Border Force, since the integration of 
immigration and detection functions, has been the staffing of the Primary Checkpoint (PCP). 
Statistical evidence, our observations and all grades of staff confirmed this focus. 
5.7  Every passenger arriving on a scheduled international flight must have their passport checked, with 
non-EEA nationals also asked a series of questions or for additional documents to see if they meet the 
requirements for entry into the United Kingdom. 
5.8   Until 2007, EEA citizens were allowed to enter the UK following a check that their passport or 
identity card was genuine. Since 2007, swipe checks against an intelligence database, known as the 
Watchlist Index7, operate for all arriving passengers including EEA nationals. 
5.9    The number of officers staffing the PCP is determined by the number of passengers arriving: it is 
demand led. In contrast, detection officers are risk led; the number of passengers does not necessarily 
determine the number of officers in the secondary examination area.8 ’Detection officers seek to 
identify the smuggling of illicit commodities using a variety of methods such as intelligence and 
profiling, selecting individuals most likely to be carrying prohibited substances. This includes flights, 
ferries, freight operations at air and sea ports and commercial shipping. 
5.10    We found extremely strong views across a wide range of officers that the training and deployment 
of detection officers to the PCP had reduced the resources available for secondary examination. As 
well as being scheduled to PCP duties, detection officers said that they were frequently removed 
from detection work for short spells to reduce the length of time passengers had to queue through 
passport control. Managers confirmed that staffing of the PCP took precedence over the detection of 
goods, which was also confirmed by our observations. We also found this in our recent inspection of 
Manchester Airport. 
5.11  Information was provided from Aberdeen and Edinburgh on the time spent by detection officers on 
the PCP over the last two years. This included time spent on training, mentoring, scheduled shifts 
and ad hoc time. Belfast supplied information from April 2010. 
5.12    The statistics below show the percentage of time detection officers spent on the PCP:
•	 4% at Aberdeen over two years;
•	 15% at Edinburgh over two years9, off-set by two immigration officers working on detection over the 
same period; and
•	 15% at Belfast for scheduled shifts since April 2010, 40% when training / mentoring included.
5.13    While the figures varied from port to port, evidence showed detection resources were affected by  
the emphasis on the PCP. This confirmed our observations that three of the officers at the PCP  
were detection officers. This was on a flight considered to be high risk for the illicit importation  
of cigarettes. 
5.14 We consider that the Agency should review the balance between staffing the PCP with allocating 
detection officers to identify illicit commodities where queuing times were being met10. This had been 
recognised by the head of Border Force in a recent internal publication. 
7  Watchlist Index – a database of names available to the UK Border Agency of those with previous immigration history, those of interest to 
detection staff, police or matters of national security. 
8  An area where UK Border Agency officials may be involved in the questioning of passengers and searching of baggage, freight and vehicles 
9  Edinburgh detection resource to the PCP was counter balanced by having two legacy immigration officers working as a detection resource 
for two years and a Chief Immigration Officer for 4 months. The Agency estimates the embedded immigration resource in detection teams 
as approximately 9% over the last 2 years and say from June to September this year the cross deployments were equal. 
10  July 2010 UKBA performance packs show North region exceeding queuing times at 98%. Border Force weekly seizure report w/e 4 
January 2011 shows North region exceeding queuing times at 99%. 
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We recommend that the UK Border Agency:
Deploys resources effectively to maintain the control of illicit commodities with the staffing of the 
Primary Checkpoint (PCP) 
Illicit Commodities
5.15  We inspected how detection officers were deployed to airports and docks to identify class A drugs and 
other illicit commodities. We also examined how the risk of smuggling over the land border from the 
Republic of Ireland was addressed. Lastly, we examined how the risk through small ports was managed, 
both in terms of illicit commodities and people.  We also comment on commercial shipping. 
Airports: deployment plans
5.16    Daily staff deployment was directed by the following sources of information:
•	 Specific targets, relating to individuals, from Targeting and Selection (T&S)11 hubs based on scrutiny 
of flight manifests;
•	 Specific intelligence from the police or other agencies;
•	 Any specific tasking from the TCG;
•	 National Border Targeting Centre (e-Borders) alerts;
•	 Profiling of individuals from high risk flights; 
•	 Profiling of flights or individuals from other flights.
5.17  Staff rosters are matched to flight schedules. At Edinburgh, rostering is performed three months in 
advance, at Aberdeen six weeks, and Belfast six months in accordance with the distinct summer and 
winter airline schedules.
5.18  Despite resources being allocated in advance, we saw no evidence of this impacting on the Agency’s 
ability to react to specific intelligence.   At Belfast Airport, we were told about the targeting of a flight 
which was not normally covered, following the receipt of intelligence from the police. This coverage at 
very short notice resulted in a seizure of half a million cigarettes and demonstrates the value of flexible 
teams. Targeting the same flight a week later resulted in a further seizure of 300,700 cigarettes. 
5.19  Teams at Belfast estimated that 50% of their deployment was based on targets from the T&S hub 
but they could not give exact figures; staff said they got more results from profiling using historical 
knowledge.  We found no analysis of the source of their seizures, whether they came from T&S 
targets or from profiling. In the 10 months to 31 January 2011, Edinburgh Airport received 35 
targets for air passengers, an average of one per week. Aberdeen received fewer than this. All three 
airports completed feedback sheets on targets and sent these to the hub. Local records were not kept. 
5.20  Managers planned staff deployment using the results of past seizures, known routes and new trends 
based on seizures. This was supplemented by information from commodity delivery plans12 and monthly 
tactical threat assessments13. We found the information contained in these assessments reinforced the 
deployment decisions made on past seizures and known routes. Information on significant seizures made 
by the teams was sent to an intelligence team to inform future threat assessments.
11  See glossary 
12  There are national delivery plans for each commodity from which flow monthly commodity delivery plans detailing the recommended 
focus for operational activity. 
13  Monthly tactical threat assessments report previous seizures, intelligence and information from various sources to recommend which 
routes should be targeted 
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Deployment to Risk
5.21    We saw evidence of staff deployment to flights deemed most likely to be carrying class A drugs 
and cigarettes at all three airports. High risk flights for cigarettes were identified mainly from past 
practice. High risk flights for drugs were identified from known routes and trends identified in 
monthly commodity delivery plans and tactical threat assessments. 
5.22    Despite aiming for maximum coverage of these flights at all three airports there were no class A 
seizures by teams at Aberdeen in 2010. In Edinburgh, there had been four personal use class A 
seizures, and small amounts were seized by teams in Belfast. This was despite class A drugs being set 
as the highest priority of the Agency. 
5.23  This could mean either that class A drugs were not coming through these airports or that they 
were being missed. We saw no evidence of a local risk assessment of what illicit commodities posed 
the greatest threat in any of the airports. We consider that national priorities may be driving local 
priorities even though the local risks may be different.
5.24  We did not gauge the effectiveness of performance against indicative targets as they were not specific 
targets to drive improvement but they do provide an idea of performance. For the six month period 
to 30 September 201014 teams at Aberdeen and Edinburgh seized 1,022,112 cigarettes against 
an indicative 12 month target of 12 million cigarettes for Scotland. Teams at Belfast had seized 
2,186,500 cigarettes against an indicative 12 month target of 8 million for Northern Ireland, 
demonstrating the relative weakness of the indicative targets. This aligns with our findings from 
the Manchester Airport report. Information received after our inspection indicated that Belfast had 
increased their seizure rate and had seized 7.4 million cigarettes by March 2011.
Getting the Balance Right
5.25  Teams at Belfast analysed flights from which they had obtained seizures and in the absence of specific 
intelligence from the hubs gave priority to targeting these flights. 
5.26  Flights from Belfast City Airport and the City of Derry Airport had been designated low risk, using 
historical knowledge, with the exception of one flight identified as a weapons risk. What may have 
been low risk flights based on local knowledge and historic results, may no longer be the case. We saw 
little evidence of the risk assessments being refreshed.
5.27  Due to the small number of targets provided by the T&S hub, teams at Aberdeen and Edinburgh 
almost exclusively deployed staff based on profiling. 
5.28  There was evidence of informal face to face briefings to inform this profiling and dissemination 
of trends to staff via regular emails. Some staff also had access to Intelnet, an intranet site showing 
information on national trends and seizures. All detection officers at Aberdeen had access to 
Intelnet, 60% at Belfast but only 25% of officers had access at Edinburgh. This was despite the 
recommendation in the HM Inspectorate of Constabulary report ‘Customised for Control’ in 200815  
that all officers should have access, particularly relevant given the high amount of self-profiling.
5.29  New routes were assessed for risk using information and intelligence supplied by the T&S hubs. We 
saw evidence in the operational activity plan (June to September 2010) of the requirement to test two 
new routes by teams at Edinburgh. The local team planned to focus on these two new routes to build 
local knowledge about the routes and associated risks. They had also changed shift times to meet a 
new flight which was a known route for cigarettes. 
14  Figures taken from a national database for the period ending September 2010 in the absence of more recent local records from all 
three areas to allow comparison 
15  HMIC report published in 2008 on HM Revenue and Customs before the merger of some of their functions with the UK Border Agency 
http://www.hmic.gov.uk/sitecollectiondocuments/hmrc/hmc_20080618.pdf 
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5.30  Deployment of detection officers was largely based on profiling and reliance on historical 
information. This was clearly the case in the targeting of flights for cigarettes and Products of Animal 
Origin (POAO) with some success. While using local knowledge can be positive, targeting flights 
from which there have been historic successes can lead to self-fulfilling intelligence.
5.31  ‘Self-fulfilling intelligence’ occurs when the targeting of flights and results drives future targeting. In 
essence it means that other flights, which could have carried individuals of interest, are potentially 
being missed. This finding was identified in the ‘Customised for Control’ report mentioned above. 
We regarded the continued reliance on historic data as being a block to the Agency building and 
refreshing a fuller intelligence picture. 
Deployment: freight 
5.32    We found there had been no positive results from searching container freight at Belfast and 
Grangemouth for the 14 months prior to our inspection in November 2010. Belfast received 1,339 
targets from 1 September 2009 to 31 October 2010 from the T & S hub. They also self-selected 262 
containers. The last seizure was 10.34 million cigarettes from a T&S target on 29 September 2009. 
5.33    Results from Grangemouth were similar. They received 1076 targets between 1 September 2009 and 
31 October 2010. There were no positive results.
5.34    For Rosyth, there were also no significant seizures from the Zeebrugge ferry. From 1 September 
2009 to 31 October 2010 there were two targets for accompanied freight from the relevant T&S 
hub. There were no targets for tourist traffic, nor any targets for unaccompanied freight. Activity was 
therefore based on profiling and trends from tactical threat assessments.
5.35  We queried the continued negative results, particularly as freight teams provided feedback to the 
T&S hub on the Freight Targeting System16. Officers gave a particular example of referrals being 
made despite the information being old e.g. the information relating to a drugs seizure from 10 years 
ago still creates a target to be investigated. The Targeting team reported only receiving direct feedback 
on positive hits, relying on controls via a spreadsheet to prevent continued targeting of negative hits. 
We comment further and make a recommendation about feedback to T & S hubs later in this report. 
5.36  We did not inspect the effectiveness of the container T & S team in particular, nor did we inspect the 
effectiveness of the process of having a range of remote T & S teams. However, there appeared to be 
an intelligence gap in regards to container traffic and an issue with feedback informing further targets 
which in turn inform deployment.
5.37    Given the lack of seizures at Belfast and Grangemouth, managers redeployed some freight team 
officers to Belfast and Edinburgh airports.  We saw no evidence that consideration had been given to 
moving these officers to address other risks such as the risk assessment of small ports. 
5.38    We also noted a gap in the coverage of air freight: teams at Aberdeen and Belfast did not cover air 
freight. Belfast management said that it arrived during the night when there were no officers available 
and there were no targets from T & S. Teams at Edinburgh, by contrast, had an agreement with 
Special Branch to cover air freight jointly three times a week. We were concerned at the lack of targets 
and inconsistency of coverage, despite the fact that the threat from air freight was identified as a risk 
in a recent intelligence document17. 
Illicit commodities from the Republic of Ireland
5.39    While we were predominantly inspecting the deployment of airport and freight detection teams, 
officers at Belfast made us aware of their concern about the low number of operations to counter the 
smuggling of cigarettes and drugs from the Republic of Ireland (ROI). They saw the main threats as 
being over the land border and ferries between Northern Ireland and Great Britain carrying traffic to   
16  System used to risk assess freight movements. 
17  Internal document published August 2010 analysing sources of heroin seizures. 
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and from the ROI. Intelligence gaps over the movement of illicit goods between the ROI, Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain were identified in a document produced by Border Force through their 
National Intelligence Analysis Team.
5.40    No detection work was being undertaken on the land border given the personal security risks to 
officers and current severe threat level from terrorism. An attempt to address the threat of illicit 
commodities crossing the land border had been addressed in the two months prior to the inspection. 
This was done by the freight team scanning outbound traffic at Larne transiting from Northern 
Ireland. This had not resulted in any seizures. A joint operation with the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (PSNI) at Belfast railway station to target passengers coming from Northern Ireland to a 
music festival was successful, resulting in seizures of three quantities of class A drugs. 
5.41    The Agency is part of both the Organised Crime Task Force and the Cross Border Tobacco 
Enforcement Group. We were informed that a month after our inspection of Belfast, an intelligence 
officer was scheduled to attend monthly meetings of a new multi agency intelligence sharing group. 
At the same time the Agency had joined a working group to develop a protocol for defining the 
responsibilities at the border with HMRC. We consider these moves to be a positive step towards 
developing the intelligence picture. 
 
Summary 
5.42    Throughout the inspection, we found that detection officers and managers were committed to 
identifying and seizing illicit commodities. We found sharing of information on trends at every level, 
informally among frontline officers and through the dissemination of tactical threat assessments. 
However the Agency found very little class A drugs over the last 12 months and no seizures from 
targeted freight in the last 14 months. We considered this to be an area where Border Force needs to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the intelligence being supplied to ensure that resources in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland are being deployed effectively. 
5.43  At the time of the inspection, both the Border Force Control Strategy 2010-11 and the Border Force 
Business Plan had not been published. The draft control strategy attempts to improve the assessment 
of the threat and harm to the border. Without a published Border Force Business Plan, there are no 
objectives in place for officers to work towards. The 2009-10 Control Strategy remained the basis for 
assessing risks and identifying priorities.
5.44  A Northern Ireland business plan was in place despite the absence of the overall Border Force 
Business Plan. We believe that this could be confusing for officers.
We recommend that the UK Border Agency:
Identifies and addresses intelligence gaps to improve the intelligence picture to better inform the 
risks to the border.
Publishes business plans and associated control strategies in a timely manner to help inform officers 
and improve targeting of resources.
General Aviation and General Maritime  
5.45  In our inspection of General Aviation (GA)18 and General Maritime (GM)19 traffic, we considered:
•	 the extent of risk and threat assessments; 
•	 immigration clearance; and
•	 the identification of illicit commodities.
 
18  General aviation (GA) refers to all flights other than military and scheduled airline and regular cargo flights, both private and commercial. 
19  Non commercial private vessels 
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 GA flights arrive at commercial airports but also through non-approved ports such as small airfields 
where there is no routine Border Force presence. GM vessels arrive through harbours, marinas and 
small inlets. Such ports and seaports are commonly referred to as ‘small ports’. We also looked at 
commercial shipping.
5.46  The number of small ports and their geographical dispersal poses a significant resourcing problem 
for the UK Border Agency. The UK Border Agency assessed there to be 543 small air and seaports in 
Scotland, and 140 in Northern Ireland20 where people seeking to circumvent passport controls or to 
bring in illicit goods could enter unchecked. They are covered by teams based in Aberdeen, Belfast, 
Edinburgh, Glasgow and Prestwick.
5.47  Establishing effective controls at small ports has been a consistent risk. In the paper entitled ‘Security 
in a Global Hub’ 21 the then Government set out a number of recommendations about how work at 
the border could be improved. This included a specific recommendation relating to small ports which 
stated: ‘The new organisation [the UK Border Agency] should give specific consideration to controls at 
small ports and airports, working closely with the police.’
5.48    The 2008 HMIC report mentioned in paragraph 5.26 said that ‘Consideration should be given to 
developing a robust risk assessment process that addresses risks along the UK border and which may provide 
coverage to many locations which currently lack any uniformed presence’. Given this context, we wanted 
to see how Border Force had sought to identify and address the risk of, and the threat posed by, illegal 
movements of people and illicit commodities through small ports in Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
Threat assessment   
5.49  Historically a threat assessment was carried out by Intelligence to look at the threat through a 
particular port from breaches of immigration. Risk assessment was carried out by operational officers 
to check that adequate controls were in place to mitigate the threat. 
5.50  We found no current programme to assess the threat posed through small ports and very few visits by 
Agency officers. This was despite the Border Force North Business Plan 2009-10 stating they would 
‘deploy to numerous small ports and seek to meet these risks to the Border’. Officers voiced concerns that 
the lack of a current business plan meant that small ports had ‘fallen off the radar’. 
5.51    Furthermore, we found a lack of clarity in regards to who had responsibility for assessing the threat 
through small ports. 
 
5.52    We found that Border Force’s own evaluation22 of their small ports’ threat assessments was as follows:
•	 Northern Ireland recognised this as a weakness and noted a ‘lack of clarity on ownership between 
operations and intelligence. Risk assessments out of date.’
•	 Scotland rated themselves as meeting the required standard commenting ‘This is an intelligence activity’.  
•	 The Border Force North intelligence assurance return stated ‘It is a standing tasking of the BFN Regional 
Intelligence team that maritime and aviation Threat Assessments are carried out on a rolling basis.’
5.53  These findings were reinforced by a range of managers and officers who told us that no-one knew who 
was meant to assess the threat, but more importantly that it was not being done. Senior managers 
confirmed the lack of attention to small ports but said that they had to prioritise resources with the 
emphasis being on the PCP. As a result of threat assessments not being carried out, subsequent risk 
assessments are less effective. 
 
20  Figures supplied by the UK Border Agency 
21  http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/nov/uk-border-review- report.pdf 
22  Border Force Standards, self assessment assurance process 
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5.54 We found that only 63 out of 683 threat assessments of small air and seaports had been conducted in 
the whole of Scotland and Northern Ireland, with none since 2008. Moreover, the threat from illicit 
commodities was not assessed in 2008 by the UK Border Agency as this predated the combining of 
detection and immigration officers. We ascertained that threat assessments had been designated as 
low priority despite GA traffic being identified as an intelligence gap for class A drugs. We consider 
that the Agency should assess the multiple risks posed through small ports.
5.55 We found inconsistencies across the commands in the way that the risk of small ports was being 
managed. We examined the risk register for each command and found that:  
•	 in Northern Ireland, it had been removed from the risk register in July 2010;
•	 in Scotland East, it had been recategorised as an issue despite the original risk being rated high;
•	 in Scotland West, it was an active risk.
5.56 The relevant intelligence team conducted threat assessments of some of the 469 small ports covered 
by the areas under inspection as follows:
•	 Aberdeen: 16 out of 266 small port threat assessments completed;
•	 Belfast: 16 out of 140 in Northern Ireland; and
•	 Edinburgh: 9 out of 63.23  
5.57  Prior to any threat assessments taking place, internet based research was undertaken. Visits were 
conducted by the intelligence team or with operational colleagues and police officers. Seven threat 
assessments had been refreshed in early 2009 via interrogation of internal databases, and by phone or 
e-mail contact with agents or harbour masters. We were concerned at the lack of recent assessment of 
threat or risk. 
5.58  We found that very few risk assessments had taken place in 2009-10. Only one risk assessment 
had been undertaken for the whole of Northern Ireland (of an airfield on 23 March 2009). The 
assessment clearly identified risks of flights from abroad not being notified to Border Force. 
5.59  Officers from Edinburgh wrote to the operators of 20 small ports in June 2009 to start a process 
of risk assessment of immigration issues. Five replies were received but had not been assessed. Prior 
to integration, detection officers from Edinburgh had performed risk assessments relating to illicit 
commodities in 2008. In 2009, they visited ten ports over two days to risk assess them with a view to 
quarterly visits thereafter. We were told that resource and cost implications had precluded this follow-
up activity.
5.60  Evidence showed that officers at Aberdeen were historically more proactive, maintaining files on 56 of 
the 266 ports in their geographical area. There had been a programme of visits which they said could 
not be adhered to because of the emphasis on the PCP and cost. Annual reviews of the immigration 
risks were undertaken using internal information, telephone contact with ports and the result of any 
visits. In 2010, they had conducted visits to nine separate ports, 14 in total with some visited more 
than once. 
5.61  The Agency has to balance the assessment of threat through small ports against their top priority of 
maintaining 100% cover on the PCP and seeking to meet indicative illicit commodity targets. Clarity 
on roles and responsibilities needs to be communicated to regional staff and more should be done to 
assess the risks. This reinforces our finding of the need to improve the intelligence picture. 
23  Figures taken from information supplied by UK Border Agency 
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We recommend that the UK Border Agency:
Devises a strategy to address the threat posed to the border by illicit commodities and people 
through small ports. 
Processes for clearing people for immigration purposes
5.62    At the time of the inspection, we were told that GA flights nationally were dealt with by the General 
Aviation Operations Centre (GAvOC) but that the process would be moving to the National Border 
Targeting Centre. Nationally, details of passengers arriving at non-approved ports are provided in 
advance by the captain or handling agent to the designated central point to be checked against 
the Watchlist Index. Scotland and Northern Ireland chose not to use this system in favour of local 
procedures. Border Force guidance24 stated that local procedures should be applied in that passengers 
could be cleared remotely. 
5.63    We found a lack of comprehensive written local procedures in how to deal with this traffic. Belfast 
had procedures for checking crew lists from commercial vessels but not for flights despite the high 
number of arrivals, see Figure 2. Belfast’s own assessment of their performance in the assurance 
process mentioned earlier was ‘not met’ with a note stating ‘work in progress’.
 5.64  Teams at Edinburgh had limited guidance for dealing with flights and crew lists but did have 
guidance for agents and harbour masters. Teams at Aberdeen also had written guidance to hand out 
to agents and harbour masters but none for officers. We acknowledge the views of the Agency that 
they had small ports teams who knew the procedures but a lack of guidance can lead to a lack of 
consistency. Nor did this lack of guidance allow for effective planning and business continuity.
5.65    Figures are provided below on GA and crew lists. Figures were not available for the small ports 
covered by Edinburgh. 
Figure 2: General Aviation and Crew lists  Recorded by Ports with Overall Responsibility 
for Small Ports in their Area
Belfast Time Period 01.04.2009 – 31.03.2010
No. of Flights 237
Flight Passengers Cleared 792 (684 EEA, 108 Non-EEA)
No. of Ship Lists Received 885
No. of Ship Crew & Passengers Cleared 7,078
Time Period 01.04.2010 – 31.07.10
No. of Flights 65
Flight Passengers Cleared 223 (152 EEA, 71 Non-EEA)
No. of Ship Lists Received 420
No. of Ship Crew & Passengers Cleared 3,878
Aberdeen Time Period 01.01.2010 – 23.09.10
No. of Ship Lists Received 1,102 
No. of Ship Crew & Passengers Cleared 31,340
Edinburgh Time Period 09.05.2010 – 06.09.10
No. of Ship Lists Received** 21
No. of Ship Crew & Passengers Cleared 18,350
 *Note – Data for Edinburgh only includes Cruise Liners as no data was available for small ports which fall within the 
responsibility of Edinburgh
24  Border Force Manual 13.2.1, section 2.1 http://horizon.gws.gsi.gov.uk/portal/site/horizon-intranet/menuitem.5e9fdfa5b28a104a4375
7f10466b8a0c/?vgnextoid=f332eaa9ec5c4210VgnVCM1000002bb1a8c0RCRD 
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5.66  These figures show the amount of traffic was significant. Concerns were raised from a wide range of 
officers that there were few compliance visits to confirm that details of all arrivals were being supplied 
and to gather intelligence.
We recommend that the UK Border Agency:
Puts in place local comprehensive written guidance for staff dealing with General Aviation, 
including compliance visits.  
Processes for identifying illicit goods
5.67    We saw no evidence of the risks from non-commercial private vessels or GA flights being assessed 
for illicit commodities, due to the lack of risk assessments as detailed above. Risks from commercial 
shipping were dealt with by the relevant T & S hub.
5.68    The T&S hub identifies commercial shipping targets, including those requiring deep rummage 
which is a full search of the hold for which specialist training is required. It also provides targets for 
local detection teams to search accessible areas onboard. Three targets were issued for Edinburgh and 
Aberdeen local detection teams, with two successes resulting in 49,800 cigarettes being seized. The 
national deep rummage teams visited Scotland three times in 2010 undertaking 20 operations as 
detailed in the table below:
Figure 3.  Commercial shipping intelligence targets: Scotland 2010
Team Number of  
Targets Issued
Number of 
Rummages
Number Not 
Rummaged
NDRT & CVRT25 7 3 4
Scotland West 12 9 3
Scotland East 2 - 2
Scotland North 5 2 3
Cutter 9 6 3
Totals 35 20 15
25
 The rummages resulted in 12 seizures totalling 112,100 cigarettes, two obscene DVD’s and two 
offensive weapons.
5.69 Overall, the targeting process is reliant on intelligence and works well with 23% national success rate 
for commercial shipping. Local detection teams boarding only a small number of ships and failing 
to engage with harbour masters and other contacts potentially resulted in an intelligence gap. Staff 
experienced frustration that, despite the limited success in detecting illicit commodities at the major 
airports, they were unable to be deployed to this alternative source of work.  
5.70  In Northern Ireland, we saw some coverage of commercial shipping although officers told us of 
their concern of the threat of illicit commodities coming via shipping at ports other than Belfast. 
Whilst targets from the T&S hub address these threats, there were no targets in Northern Ireland 
for the deep rummage teams in 2010. Twenty targets were issued to local detection teams: five were 
rummaged, six were not, and no feedback was given to the T&S hub on the action taken for the 
remaining nine. 
5.71   At the time of the inspection, we noted that of the 32 ships boarded by the freight team, only two 
were in locations other than Belfast despite the last significant seizure of cigarettes being at Warren 
Point (outside of Belfast). A seizure of 250,000 cigarettes was made from a ship at Belfast when the 
harbour police saw a suspicious vehicle on CCTV. This showed that cigarettes were coming through 
on commercial shipping but no intelligence to this effect had been received. 
25  NDRT is the deep rummage training team and CVRT is the training team 
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5.72  This reinforced our view of a lack of a comprehensive intelligence picture and adds weight to our 
earlier recommendation to improve the intelligence picture to better inform the risks to the border. 
Moreover feedback mechanisms were not functioning as they should. We noted earlier that the 
freight targeting team only received feedback from positive hits.
We recommend that the UK Border Agency:
Ensures that frontline staff provide feedback and that it is used to inform the targeting process
There is effective joint working with external and internal delivery partners, stakeholders 
including enforcement and security agencies; in particular the links between Border 
Force and the Immigration Group
Stakeholders: Police
5.73    There was some evidence of good working relationships with the police, PSNI in Northern Ireland 
and Special Branch (SB) teams in Scotland. We have commented previously on the successful 
operation at Belfast railway station run jointly with PSNI and the seizure of a considerable number  
of cigarettes at Belfast International Airport following intelligence received from the police.
5.74    Grampian Police SB at Aberdeen reported good working relationships with Border Force, citing 
joint local intelligence meetings and informal contact through co-located offices as helping to build 
that relationship. They also acted as a conduit to pass information from Grampian Police with 
responsibility for the seaports and small ports. Teams at Aberdeen confirmed that Grampian Police 
SB officers enhanced their capability in remote locations where they had part-time officers.  However 
we saw no evidence of joint risk assessments.
5.75    We saw some evidence of joint working with Lothian and Borders SB at Edinburgh where they 
had done a joint ship boarding exercise in March, covering five vessels in four days. This was done 
in conjunction with SB and Fife police as a compliance check of manifests against crew. Detection 
officers also formed part of the team. The ships were profiled from the route, crew, previous revenue 
history and cargo. There were no seizures but we were told that the Agency was hoping to use the 
exercise to build relationships leading to joint risk assessments. 
 5.76   Lothian and Borders Special Branch, based at Edinburgh, have a small ports unit. Over the last two 
years they had risk assessed every port/harbour from a counter terrorism perspective. This work was 
part of a national police initiative to map every UK port from a policing and counter terrorism angle. 
5.77  Every month they visited those ports they had assessed as being high risk. Although the Agency 
reported good working relationships with SB at Edinburgh, there was little evidence at the time 
of the inspection of joint risk assessments or of information sharing. SB confirmed that they were 
willing to share information and undertake joint risk assessments. We considered that much more 
could be done locally and nationally to work with the police to share resources and information to 
meet the multiple threats to the UK border. 
We recommend that the UK Border Agency:
Initiates a multi agency approach to risk assessing small ports, working with the police, port 
operators and any other relevant organisations.
Other stakeholders
5.78  Despite the reduced operational engagement between frontline officers and contacts at small ports as 
described above, there was evidence of good working relationships with port operators at a strategic level.
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5.79    Port operators in all three locations commented on improvements in their engagement with the 
Agency, with particular praise for the management teams. Edinburgh Airport reported that issues 
around the throughput of passengers had improved through effective liaison. Monthly arrival times of 
flights were supplied to the Agency, broken down into 15 minute slots, to allow them to plan officer 
deployment to the PCP more effectively. An effective queue management system using CCTV had 
been implemented.
5.80     A potential security issue had been identified and addressed by the UK Border Agency at Edinburgh 
Airport. International passengers passed through a secure corridor adjacent to the Common User Lounge 
from which there was access without having to pass through passport control. There had been seven 
security breaches in the last three years, into but not out of the lounge, enabling arriving passengers to 
exit the airport without passing through immigration control. The Agency had managed the situation, 
ensuring the Airport Authority mitigated against future occurrence through improved door security, 
officer training and CCTV coverage. It remains under review.  In contrast, a similarly significant security 
issue identified during our inspection at Manchester Airport was not remedied until drawn to the 
attention of the Agency’s Chief Executive during our inspection.
5.81    Port operators in Northern Ireland had formal agreements in place with the Agency and hold regular 
meetings. Larne Port Operator praised the Agency for being open to moving detection operations to 
allow them to conduct searches and minimise the impact on other passengers.  Larne and the City of 
Derry Airport commented on the strong three-way relationship with the Agency and PSNI (Police 
Service of Northern Ireland). Belfast Harbour praised the effective planning by Border Force to 
ensure clearance was given to ships/crew to ensure the smooth running of the Tall Ships Festival.  
5.82    The Scottish Government gave extremely positive feedback, praising Border Force senior managers 
for putting in place and maintaining very good working relationships.
Integration
5.83    Two of the port operators commented that the ‘integration’ of legacy detection and immigration was 
not clear from an external viewpoint. They said there were two points of contact and that each sent 
a representative to meetings. This was particularly obvious on the airport focussed Multi-Agency 
Threat and Risk Assessment (MATRA) group which has a representative from each control authority 
(such as the airport, the Agency, Police, Serious Organised Crime Agency etc.) This group has no 
connection with the risk assessment of small ports.
5.84  This lack of integration was supported by evidence from interviews, focus groups and from 
observations. We considered that this had the potential to impact on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Agency. However the imminent move of detection officers from an off-site 
office to Belfast International Airport and the planned move to joint teams at Edinburgh should 
improve integrated operations. 
5.85  In our inspection of Manchester Airport, we noted that far fewer legacy immigration officers were 
trained to work in the secondary examination area compared to detection officers trained on the 
PCP. Detection officers can work on the PCP with ‘Pre IS81’ training while legacy immigration 
officers require SEAT26 training to work in the secondary examination area. A similar trend was 
found in Belfast, Aberdeen and Edinburgh where, across the three locations, almost 100% of relevant 
detection staff were trained on PCP duties, but only 9% of PCP staff had received SEAT training. 
Figure 4 below gives details:
26  Secondary examination area training 
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Figure 4:  Integration Training by Port and Role
Detection Officers trained for Immigration role
Port No. of Legacy 
Detection Officers*
Pre IS81 %
Belfast 4427 44 100
Aberdeen 13 13 100
Edinburgh 20 19 95
Immigration Officers trained for Detection roles
Port No. of Legacy 
Immigration Officer*
SEAT %
Belfast 20 2 10
Aberdeen 14 0 0
Edinburgh 32 4 12
 *Includes Higher Officer (HO) and Chief Immigration Officer (CIO) Grades 27
5.86  We noted, however, that two legacy immigration officers at Edinburgh had been working as detection 
officers for two years. A further two officers at Belfast, three at Aberdeen and six at Edinburgh were 
either being trained or scheduled for SEAT training. 
5.87  As well as limited integration within Border Force, we observed little liaison between Border Force 
and Immigration Group who deal with enforcement work. As reported in our inspection of the 
Common Travel Area, detection officers working at Belfast City Airport and enforcement officers 
undertaking an operation at the same airport had not been involved in joint planning to mitigate the 
impact on the public. This resulted in people being questioned by two different parts of the Agency. 
We were advised that recent liaison had begun between Border Force and Immigration Group to 
discuss enforcement work at the docks. For the moment, however, we noted that UK Border Agency 
appeared disjointed both to us and to stakeholders. 
27   Figures taken from organograms and training records supplied by UKBA 
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 Objective criteria based on evidence are applied consistently and transparently, without 
unjustified/unauthorised adverse impact on any nationality/ethnic group
6.1 There was no evidence of unfair treatment during our observations of people being stopped for search 
by detection officers. However this was based on limited observations of interactions with primarily 
European Economic Area (EEA) nationals. Officers were able to explain the reasons for stopping 
each person stopped during our observations at Aberdeen, Belfast and Edinburgh. They explained the 
indicators they use to make their selections in the absence of intelligence or targets.
6.2  Every time a person was stopped, officers were required to record this in their notebooks, including the 
reasons for the selection and the appropriate legislative grounds. This should be done irrespective of the 
result of the search.  This was overseen by manager observations of the work and assurance checks on 
notebooks. This is an issue we commented on in our inspections of Manchester Airport and Intelligence 
and will be subject of a full examination as part of our inspections of ports in 2011-12.
6.3  Border Force self assesses their performance against a set of standards for each part of their work. 
Northern Ireland had assessed themselves as not fully having the appropriate controls in place in 
October 2010. This was because checks were made regularly but not daily.  Scotland had self assessed 
as doing daily assurance checks on notebooks.
6.4  The Targeting Manual gave clear guidance on the procedures to be followed to provide alerts 
identifying which passengers should be stopped. They were based on scrutinising inbound passenger 
manifests using profiles. Routing, ticketing, known travel agent, connecting flights and unusual 
booking patterns were all considered. A number of databases would also be checked for previous 
seizures or any adverse information. 
 UK Border Agency officers are professional, courteous and respectful when dealing with 
customers, irrespective of their status 
6.5  Through our observations we saw officers treat passengers with courtesy. At Aberdeen in particular, 
we saw officers interacting well with people they had stopped whose command of English was 
limited. Officers used language cards covering questions and explanations connected with detection, 
translated into the most common languages encountered. This initiative appeared to improve 
communication but we had some concerns that the telephone interpreting service was not available 
to officers. This is an area we will look at in future port inspections. 
6.6    Airport authorities reported that they received verbal and written complaints direct from the public. 
Over the past 12 months, very few complaints had been received about the Agency’s officers but the 
exact number had not been recorded. All the port operators said that the Agency’s officers scored well in 
the independent airport customer survey conducted by Airport Service Quality28. One of the measures 
was courtesy and helpfulness of officers on the PCP. For the quarter ending September 2010, all three of 
the ports scored just above or below four. The rating was on a scale of excellent (5) to poor (1).
28  http://www.airportservicequality.aero/content/performance/using.html 
6.  Inspection Findings – Processes and 
procedures, consistency of approach 
and impact on people subject to UK 
Border Agency services
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6.7    We looked at the number of written complaints for all Border Force officers in the three areas under 
inspection over 2009 and 2010:
Figure 5:  Written complaints
Airport Year Delays / Admin Process 
unsubstantiated 
(substantiated)
Rudeness 
unsubstantiated
(substantiated)
Aberdeen
2009 2 1
to July 2010 0 0
Edinburgh
2009 24 1
to July 2010 7 (2) 3
Belfast
2009 4 8
to July 2010 5 4 (1)
6.8    The number of written complaints in the three airports inspected was 39 in 2009 and 19 in the period 
to July 2010. Only 7 complaints in 2010 were for unprofessional behaviour: one was substantiated. The 
small number of complaints received relative to the number of passengers passing through the ports 
supports our observations that officers were professional in their dealings with the public.
6.9    However, in all three locations officers said they received frequent verbal complaints. The incident log 
record records five verbal complaints from 1 April to 30 September 2010 at Aberdeen, and four at 
Edinburgh Airport during the same period. Managers told us that the majority of verbal complaints 
were about having illicit commodities, such as cigarettes, seized rather than complaints about officers’ 
behaviour. However the failure to log all complaints meant that this could not be corroborated. 
Managers acknowledged that some complaints were related to stops because of ethnic origin. They 
attempted to resolve all verbal complaints onsite, including those alleging unfair treatment due to 
ethnic origin and provided leaflets on how to make written complaints. We did not observe any 
verbal complaints being made.
6.10    Failing to log all verbal complaints and report them to the Border Force Customer Service Unit 
is contrary to UK Border Agency guidance on complaint handling. The guidance states that ‘any 
expression of dissatisfaction’ should be recorded. This was not being done which meant there was no 
record of the number or type of complaints being received. Ambiguity over the process to be followed 
on verbal complaints was also found in our thematic inspection on the UK Border Agency’s handling 
of complaints and in our inspection of the Agency’s Loughborough Reporting Centre.29  
29  Handling of complaints inspection report: http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Lessons-to-learn_The-
UK-Border-Agencys-handling-of-complaints-and-MPs-correspondence.pdf
Loughborough reporting centre inspection report: http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Loughborough-
Unannounced-Inspection-Report2.pdf
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 The criteria used in this inspection were taken from the Independent Chief Inspector’s Core 
Inspection Criteria. They are shown below.
 Section 1 – High level outcomes of the business
 1.1 General Criterion: The borders are secured and immigration is controlled for the benefit of 
the country. The specific criteria are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 – Specific criteria:
1.1(b) Operational policies, priorities and deployment of staff is driven by clear analysis of 
environment, risks, threats, capabilities and impact (tailored criterion)
1.1(c) There is effective joint working with delivery partners and stakeholders including 
enforcement and security agencies; carriers; local authorities; employers and educational 
establishments 
 Section 2 – Processes and procedures including quality of decision making and consistency  
of approach
 2.1 General Criterion:  UK Border Agency is compliant with equalities legislation and specific 
duties in relation to race and diversity.  The specific criterion is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 – Specific criterion:
2.1(c)  Objective criteria based on evidence are applied consistently and transparently, without 
unjustified/unauthorised adverse impact on any nationality/ethnic group
 Section 3 – Impact on people subject to UK Border Agency services
 3.1 General Criterion: UK Border Agency staff and staff of commercial partners are welcoming 
and engage positively with customers and other users.  The specific criterion is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 – Specific criterion:
3.1(b)  UK Border Agency staff are professional, courteous and respectful when dealing with 
customers, irrespective of their status
Appendix 1 
Inspection Framework and Core Criteria
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 During the inspection, we contacted and consulted with a wide variety of stakeholders who are  
listed below.
•	 Aberdeen Harbour
•	 Belfast City Airport
•	 Belfast International Airport
•	 Belfast Port
•	 British Airports Authority
•	 British Air Transport Association
•	 Clyde Port Authority
•	 City of Derry Airport Manager
•	 Londonderry Port Authority
•	 Forth Port Authority
•	 Immigration Service Union 
•	 Larne Harbour
•	 Members of Parliament for Scotland
•	 Members of the Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly 
•	 Public and Commercial Services Union
•	 Police Service of Northern Ireland
•	 Scottish Executive
•	 Serious Organised Crime Agency
•	 Warrenpoint Harbour Authority
Appendix 2 
List of stakeholders
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Term Description
A
Agency Refers to the UK Border Agency
Assistant Director Equivalent to Grade 7, see below
Audit trail Chronological list of events
B
Biometrics All customers are now routinely required to provide ten-digit finger scans 
and a digital photograph when applying for a United Kingdom visa. There 
are some minor exceptions to this rule, e.g. Heads of State and children 
under five.
Border Force Part of the UK Border Agency, responsible for frontline operations at air, sea 
and rail ports.
Border Force 
Control Strategy
Provides a framework to assess and prioritise risk to assist in decision making 
processes and resource allocation.
Border and 
Immigration 
Agency (BIA) 
The name of the agency responsible for immigration functions prior to 
creation of the UK Border Agency.
C
Casework 
Information 
Database (CID)
The Case Information Database is an administrative tool, used by the Agency 
to perform asylum tasks including recording all applications for asylum, with 
the related casework and decisions.
Chief Executive 
Officer
Senior Civil Servant at the head of the UK Border Agency.
Commodities Drugs, cigarettes, money.
Common Travel 
Area (CTA)
Allows free movement between Britain, Ireland, the Isle of Man and the 
Channel Islands, subject to conditions set out in the Immigration Act 1971.
Complaint Defined by the UK Border Agency as ‘any expression of dissatisfaction about 
the services provided by or for the UK Border Agency and/or about the 
professional conduct of UK Border Agency staff including contractors’.
Complaints 
management 
guidance
The formal UK Border Agency guidance for the management and handling  
of complaints
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Customer Defined by the UK Border Agency as anyone who uses the services of the 
Agency, including people seeking to enter the United Kingdom, people in 
detention and MPs.
Customer Hosts Staff employed by the airport to greet passengers as they enter the arrivals 
hall of the airport, offering general assistance where necessary
D
Detection A function carried out by Border Force staff in the customs area (to detect 
the illicit trade or importation of illegal goods).
Director Senior UK Border Agency manager, typically responsible for a directorate, 
region or operational business area.
E
e-Borders A multi-agency programme being delivered by the UK Border Agency in 
partnership with the police and the security and intelligence agencies. It 
focuses on the capture and analysis of passenger and crew data from carriers, in 
advance of movements into and out of the UK by air, sea and rail.
European 
Economic Area 
(EEA)
The European Economic Area (EEA) was established on 1 January 1994 
following an agreement between the member states of the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Community, later the European 
Union (EU). 
All EEA nationals enjoy free movement rights in the EEA. This means that 
they are not subject to the Immigration Rules and may come to the United 
Kingdom and reside here in accordance with the 2006 Regulations. They do 
not require permission from the UK Border Agency to enter or remain, nor 
do they require a document confirming their free movement status.
Executive Officer Lower management grade. Equivalent grades exist in the
UK Border Agency, including Officer and Immigration officer.
F
Facial Recognition 
System
Border security technology which scans each passenger's face against the 
digital photo recorded in their passport. If there is a match, the automatic 
gates allow the clearance of EU passengers across the border.
G
General Aviation General aviation (GA) refers to all flights other than military and scheduled 
airline and regular cargo flights, both private and commercial.
General Maritime Non-commercial private craft
Grade 7 Senior manager, subordinate to Grade 6, superior to a Senior Executive Officer.
H
Her Majesty’s 
Inspector of 
Immigration 
(HMI)
The UK Border Agency senior manager primarily responsible for legacy 
immigration staff.
Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC)
HMRC Detection operated at air, sea and rail ports. It was one of the legacy 
organisations that made up the UK Border Agency.
29
Scotland and Northern Ireland
Border Operations Inspection
Higher Executive 
Officer (HEO)
A management grade. Equivalent grades exist within the UK Border Agency, 
including Higher Officer and Chief Immigration Officer.
Home Office The Home Office is the lead government department for immigration and 
passports, drugs policy, crime, counter-terrorism and police.
I
Immigration 
Group
The directorate within the UK Border Agency responsible for asylum, 
enforcement, compliance and nationality. 
Independent Chief 
Inspector of the 
UK Border Agency
The role of the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency 
was established by the UK Borders Act 2007 to examine the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the UK Border Agency.  The Chief Inspector is independent 
of the UK Border Agency and reports directly to the Home Secretary.
Intelnet UK Border Agency database providing up-to-date information by product 
on intelligence, threat assessments, recent seizures, trend alerts and more.
Integration The term used to describe the process of integrating immigration and 
customs functions within the UK Border Agency.
International 
Group
The overseas arm of the UK Border Agency, responsible for running visa 
operations in 135 countries. Formerly known as UK Visas.
L
Legacy customs 
functions
Term used to describe the customs detection functions undertaken by the 
UK Border Agency since integration.
Legacy 
immigration 
functions
Term used to describe the immigration functions undertaken by the UK 
Border Agency since integration.
Legacy 
organisations
The three organisations that formed the UK Border Agency: the Border and 
Immigration Agency, UK Visas and HMRC Detection.
M
Member of 
Parliament (MP)
Elected representative in the United Kingdom and key
customer of the UK Border Agency.
Minister The Minister of State for Borders and Immigration is a
member of Her Majesty’s Government with responsibility
for matters relating to immigration.
N
National Border 
Targeting Centre 
(NBTC)
A central hub staffed by the UK Border Agency and the Police, undertaking 
operational activities integral to the e-Borders programme
Non–Approved 
Ports, also known 
as non–designated 
ports
Non-Approved Ports is the name given to small air and sea ports that are not 
generally staffed by Border Force and are covered by larger ports.
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Non-visa nationals A national or citizen of any country that is not listed on the UK Border 
Agency website (Appendix 1 of the Immigration Rules). A non-visa national 
does not need a visa to come to the United Kingdom for less than six 
months, unless it is a requirement of the immigration category under which 
they are entering. A non-visa national coming to the United Kingdom for 
more than six months will need a visa.
P
Performance. 
Development 
Review (PDR)
An appraisal system for monitoring staff performance.
POISE The IT system/platform used by Immigration Group.
Police Referral 
Programme
A joint programme with the host police force to take action against  
visa applicants who submit forged documents or fraudulent travel or  
supporting documents.
Primary 
Checkpoint
An initial border control point combining both customs and immigration 
functions.
R
Race Relations Act 
1976
An Act of Parliament established to prevent discrimination on the grounds  
of race.
(The) Region Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Regional Director Senior manager responsible for one of the six Immigration Group regions.
Regionalisation The creation of six UK Border Agency immigration regions.
Removal The process by which a person or person(s) voluntarily, through assistance or 
through enforcement by UK Border Agency staff, physically leaves the UK 
after a failed asylum application.
Risk Profile A profile developed through the use of compliance exercises to identify areas 
of risk.
S
Secondary 
Examination Area 
(SEA)
An area where UK Border Agency officials may be involved in the 
questioning of passengers and searching of baggage, freight and vehicles.
Senior Customs 
Officer (SO)
The UK Border Agency senior manager primarily responsible for legacy 
customs staff.  
Senior Executive 
Officer
A management grade, subordinate to Grade 7. Equivalent grades exist within 
the UK Border Agency, including Senior Officer and Her Majesty’s Inspector.
Serious Organised 
Crime Agency 
(SOCA)
An Executive Non-Departmental Public Body of the Home Office 
responsible for pro-active operations against serious and organised crime.
Service complaint Category of complaint concerning the way that the UK Border Agency 
works, for example delays, lost documents or administrative failings. These 
complaints are both about the actual service provided and the operational 
policies that the Agency operates.
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Strategic Threat 
Assessment (STA)
A document which describes and assesses the threats to the UK border from 
irregular migration, organised crime, terrorism and smuggling and considers 
how these threats might develop.
Substantiated Used to describe a complaint that has been upheld, may also be partially 
substantiated.
T
Targeting and 
selection (T&S) 
hub
A central hub where staff scrutinise flight manifests to identify those whose 
routing or other indicators suggest that an individual/s may be importing 
illicit goods.
Tasking and 
coordination 
group (TCG)
A system to prioritise threats, set objectives and plan resources and action  
at all levels of the organisation. In essence a business process supported  
by intelligence.
U
UK Visas Ran visa operations at overseas locations. One of the legacy organisations that 
made up the UK Border Agency and is now known as International Group.
United Kingdom 
and Islands
The United Kingdom is made up of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man are not part of the United 
Kingdom. The geographical term ‘British Isles’ covers the United Kingdom, 
all of Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.
United Kingdom 
Border Agency
The agency of the Home Office responsible for border control, enforcing 
immigration and customs regulations. It also considers applications for 
permission to enter and stay in the UK, including nationality and asylum 
applications.
V
Visa Nationals Visa nationals are those who require a visa for every entry to the United 
Kingdom. A visa national is a national of a country listed on the UK Border 
Agency website (Appendix 1 of the Immigration Rules). Some visa nationals 
may pass through the United Kingdom on the way to another country 
without a visa, but in some circumstances they will require a direct airside 
visa or visitor in transit visa. Visa nationals must obtain entry clearance 
before travelling to the United Kingdom unless they are:
•	 returning residents;
•	 those who have been given permission to stay in the United Kingdom 
and, after temporarily leaving the United Kingdom, return within the 
duration of that permission to stay;
•	 school children resident in a European Union member state who 
are on an organised school trip from a general education school and 
accompanied by a teacher.
W
Watchlist Index A database of names available to the UK Border Agency of those with 
previous immigration history, those of interest to detection staff, police or 
matters of national security.
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